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Carpentier: Workmen's Compensation

WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION
I.

LIBERAL CONSTRUCTION

The compensation act is liberally construed in favor of coverage and doubts over the Act's applicability are resolved in favor
of compensation for an injured employee.' An injury must be "by
accident arising out of and in the course of employment" for the
claimant to recover under the Act.' "The term 'arose out of'refers
to the origin of the cause of the accident, while the term 'in the
course of' refers to the time, place and circumstances under which
it occured." ' As a result of the doctrine of liberal construction, if
an employee's activity logically relates to his job and is not inconsistent with his duties the activity usually is within the course of
his employment.4 Similarly an injury is caused by a work-related
accident if the result is unexpected, even though it may have
developed gradually and without a pinpointable impact Two
1977 cases demonstrate applications of the liberal construction
principle.6
A.

Diseases as Accidents

In Sturkie v. Ballenger Corp.,7 the supreme court was faced
with the question of whether emphysema is a compensable accident. The claimant was employed in Puerto Rico as a cement
truck driver. His employment exposed him to rain, high humidity, hot temperatures, and cement and dynamite dust. The
claimant was hospitalized on two occasions for his condition.
After returning to work, he blacked out while on the job. The
claimant filed for disability insurance benefits.
The Commission found for the claimant. It held he was subject to a greater risk of adverse exposure to the elements by his
employment and that after his hospitalization, reexposure under
1. E.g., Carter v. Penney Tire & Recapping Co., 261 S.C. 341, 349, 200 S.E.2d 64, 67

(1973).
2. S.C. CODE ANN. § 42-1-160 (1976).

3. Bickley v. South Carolina Electric & Gas, 259 S.C. 463, 467, 192 S.E.2d 866, 868
(1972) (citation omitted).

4. Beam v. State Workmen's Compensation Fund, 261 S.C. 327, 332, 200 S.E.2d 83,
86 (1973) (citing Kohlmayer v. Keller, 24 Ohio St. 2d 10, 263 N.E.2d 231 (1970)).

5. Hiers v. Brunson Constr. Co., 221 S.C. 212, 231, 70 S.E.2d 211, 219-20 (1952).
6. See also Moore v. Family Service of Charleston County, 269 S.C. 275, 237 S.E.2d

84 (1977).
7. 268 S.C. 536, 235 S.E.2d 120 (1977).
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strenuous exertion caused his collapse and disability.8 The circuit
court affirmed. On appeal to the supreme court the issue was
whether a disease contracted from exposure to the elements is a
compensable accident under the Act.
The supreme court discussed the requirement that the accident must arise out of and in the course of employment, and
upheld the Commission.' The court emphasized three factors.
First, the term "accident" within the meaning of the compensation act has been interpreted as an unexpected result or effect. 0
This claimant-oriented definition of accident is in line with the
doctrine of liberal interpretation in favor of coverage for the
claimant. 1 Because Sturkie did not expect to develop emphy-

sema, it was a compensable accident. 2 "Emphysema develops
gradually, but its effect in collapse is sudden."' 3 Second, in dealing with atmospheric conditions, the question is "'whether under
all the circumstances, the employee was exposedto a greater risk
by reason of his employment and duties than was imposed upon
an ordinary member of the public.' ""' The court agreed that the
claimant had been exposed to atmospheric weather conditions
different from those experienced by the general public. 5 Third,
even if the claimant's emphysema was a preexisting condition, if
it was exacerbated or accelerated by work-related causes, it was
a compensable accident. 6
The court's rationale is not surprising. In Hiers v. Brunson,7
the court addressed the issue of whether the environment can
cause a compensable accident under the Act, 8 and developed the
principles applied in Sturkie. As noted in Hiers, other states also
follow a general rule of allowing recovery for diseases contracted
during employment when the nature of the job causes the claimant to be exposed to the elements to a greater extent than the
8. Record at 83, 93.
9. 268 S.C. at 539-43, 235 S.E.2d at 121-23. Justice Littlejohn dissented, stating
diseases should not be classified as accidents. Id. at 544-45, 235 S.E.2d at 124.
10. Id. at 540, 235 S.E.2d at 122.
11. See

A.

LARSON, THE LW OF WORKMExN'S COMPENSATION

§ 37.20

(1978).

12. See 268 S.C. at 542-43, 235 S.E.2d at 123.
13. Id. at 542, 235 S.E.2d at 123.
14. Id. at 542, 235 S.E.2d at 122-23 (citing Hiers v. Brunson, 221 S.C. 212, 230, 70
S.E.2d 211, 219 (1952)). For a criticism of the unusual exposure requirement, see A.
LARSON, supra note 11, at §§ 38.60-.63.
15. 268 S.C. at 542, 235 S.E.2d at 123. See A. LARSON, supra note 11, at § 8.41-.42.
16. 268 S.C. at 541, 235 S.E.2d at 122. See A. LARSON, supra note 11, at § 12.20.
17. 221 S.C. 212, 70 S.E.2d 211 (1952).
18. Id. at 230-32, 70 S.E.2d at 219-20.
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general population.' 9
The tendency of courts to find diseases to be compensable
"accidents" exemplifies how the courts liberally construe the requirement that an accident arise out of and in the course of employment. Another facet of this liberality is the South Carolina
courts' willingness to allow a claim to be classified as an accident
rather than as a disease. 0 The Act specifically provides for compensation for certain disabling diseases related to employment. 2'
Because the employer was not liable at common law for occupational diseases, at first legislatures were hesitant to create liability for these diseases and courts were hesitant to read the statutes
as compensating for them. 22 Even though South Carolina now has
occupational disease provisions, these sections are more restrictive than those governing accidents.
For the claimant in Sturkie to have recovered for an occupational disease, he would have had to prove not only that the
disease was caused by hazards greater than those to which the
general public is exposed, but also that the hazard was "in this
state" and was recognized as peculiar to the business. A disease
also does not meet the statutory criteria if it "results from exposure to outside climatic conditions. '24 Generally, if brought under
the accident provisions, acceleration of a preexisting condition is
fully compensable. 5 With occupational diseases, however, if the
disease is found to accelerate some condition that is "not otherwise compensable," compensation is limited by that proportion
of the disability that the "occupational disease bears to the entire
disability. ' 2 Another restricting factor is the statute of limita-

tions imposed upon the occupational disease claimant. The supreme court has held that for occupational diseases, the time for
filing a compensation claim with the employer is calculated from
the point at which the employee is disabled and "'when by reasonable diligence the claimant could have discovered his condition was a compensable one.' ",27 Disability is actual incapacity to
19. See A. LARSON, supra note 11, at §§ 8.41-.42, 39.10.
20. S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 42-11-10 to -200 (1976 & Cum. Supp. 1977).

21. Id.
22.
23.
24.
25.
26.
27.

A. LARSON, supra note 11, at § 41.20 nn.9-11.
S.C. CODE ANN. § 42-11-10 (1976).
Id. § 42-11-10(2).
See note 16 and accompanying text supra.
S.C. CODE ANN. § 42-11-90 (1976).
Drake v. Raybestos-Manhattan, Inc., 241 S.C. 116, 123, 127 S.E.2d 288, 292

(1962) (citing A.

LARSON,

supra note 11, at § 78.52). See Glenn v. Columbia Silica Sand
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perform the employee's work.2 In addition, for a pulmonary disease, the employee's last exposure to the hazard must have been
within two years of the contracting of the disease. 29 A problem
with some occupational diseases is that if the employee ceases to
be exposed to the hazard or if the disease is not immediately
found to be work related, the statutory time limits may have

lapsed.
In addition to these differences between the accident and
disease provisions, either the claimant, employer, or the Commis-

sion can move to submit medical questions in an occupational
disease claim to a Medical Board. 0 The Act binds the Commission to follow the Medical Board's findings unless they are proved

to be "erroneous, due to fraud, undue influence, or mistake of law
or material facts." 3' If Sturkie had filed under the occupational
disease provisions, he would have been bound by the findings of
the Medical Board if the employer or the Commission moved to
submit a medical question to it and would have been foreclosed
from supplying his own medical testimony. Normally claimants
would rather supply their own medical experts and face the
"arising out of" and "in the course of" requirements of the accident provisions rather than deal with the stricter requirements of
the occupational disease provisions. The liberal construction of
the accident requirement circumvents the disease provisions be-

cause these injuries, which might logically be classified as occupational diseases, are liberally construed to be accidents.
An employer faced with payments for a disease of this kind
Co., 263 S.C. 13, 112 S.E.2d 711 (1960) (dicta) (the one year time limit is calculated from
the time of disability from disease, not from the time of contraction of the disease).

28. S.C. CODE ANN. § 42-11-20 (1976).
29. Id. § 42-11-70. For byssinosis, the statute also requires that the claimant be
"exposed to dust in his employment for a period of at least seven years." Id. § 42-11-60
(Cum. Supp. 1977).
30. Id. § 42-11-120 (1976). A medical question is "any issue concerning the existence,
cause and duration of disease or disability, the date of disablement, the degree of disability and the proportion thereof attributable to a non-compensable cause and any other
matter necessarily pertinent thereto requiring the opinion of experts." Id. The Board is
chosen from a group of medical experts who are appointed to the Medical Advisory Panel
by the governor with the approval of the Commission. Id. § 42-11-170 (Cum. Supp. 1977).
31. Id. § 42-11-160. A 1977 amendment to this section removed the requirement that
upon such a finding of error the Commission must remand the medical questions to the
same or another Medical Board. No. 103, 1977 S.C. Acts 188. One could argue the intent
is to allow the parties to supply their own medical witnesses after the overturning of one
Medical Board report; conversely, one could argue the provision in § 42-11-190 that allows
either party or the Commission to move for a Medical Board Report still can be utilized
on remand. Id. § 42-11-190 (1976).
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that he believes resulted from the aggravation of a permanent,
preexisting, nonwork-related condition that would have been an
obstacle to the employee's obtaining employment might consider
applying to the Second Injury Fund for reimbursement of compensation and medical payments after the first seventy-eight
weeks of compensation. 2 The Second Injury Fund was created
initially to encourage the hiring of the handicapped by relieving
the employer of the risk that any later injury to the employee
would cause the employee to be eligible for greater compensation
payments than if the employee had not had the permanent physical impairments. 3 Originally the employer had to file with the
Commission a written statement either that the employer knew
of the impairment at the time of hiring or that he retained the
employee after learning of it.3 A 1974 amendment, however, qual-

ifies an employer for Second Injury Fund reimbursement if he can
prove that "the existence of such condition was concealed by the
employee or was unknown to the employee.

'35

The employer,

therefore, no longer must show that he hired or retained the employee with knowledge of the handicap; it is sufficient if the injury was unrelated to this employment and was either concealed
by the employee or unknown to him. If the impairment is not one
presumed to be permanent,36 the employer must prove that it was
32. S.C. CODE ANN. § 42-9-400 (Cum. Supp. 1977). Second Injury Fund relief is for
permanent physical impairments. Id. § 42-9-400(a). A "permanent physical impairment"

is defined as one serious enough to be "a hindrance or obstacle to obtaining employment."
Id. § 42-9-400(d). For the full definition, see notes 33, 36 infra.
33. Boone's Masonry Construction Co. v. South Carolina Second Injury Fund, 267

S.C. 277, 281-82, 227 S.E.2d 659, 661 (1976). See Custy, The Second Injury Fund: Encouraging Employment of the Handicapped in South Carolina, 27 S.C.L. REv. 661 (1976).
"'[P]ermanent physical impairment' means any permanent condition, whether congenital or due to injury or disease, of such seriousness as to constitute a hindrance or obstacle

to obtaining employment or to obtaining reemployment if the employee should become
unemployed." S.C. CODE ANN. § 42-9-400(d) (Cum. Supp. 1977).
34. Act of June 20, 1972, No. 1390 § 1(c), 1972 S.C. Acts 2578 (amended 1974)
(current version at S.C. CODE ANN. § 41-9-400(c) (Cum. Supp. 1977)).
35. S.C. CODE ANN. § 42-9-400(c) (Cum. Supp. 1977).

36. Id. § 42-9-400(d)(1) to (30). This section is ambiguous because it states that a
presumption of permanence and hindrance to employment "exists when the condition is

any one of the following impairments." The statute there lists 30 specific impairments and
one general one:

(31) Any other preexisting condition or impairment which is permanent in
nature and which:
(a) would qualify for payment of weekly disability benefits of seventyeight weeks or more under § 42-9-30 exclusive of benefits payable for disfigurement or
(b) would support a rating of seventy-eight or more weeks of weekly disability benefits when evaluated according to the standards applied to workmen's
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"permanent in nature" 3 and that the impairment either alone s
or when added to the later injury makes the employee eligible for
at least seventy-eight weeks of disability payments. 3 The em-

ployer can opt to bind the Fund to the Commission's findings at
the original hearing by giving notice to the Fund at least twenty
days before the liability hearing or by joining the Fund as a party

to the hearing. 0 If this option is not taken, the employer must,
in writing, notify the fund and the Commission of the claim before the first seventy-eight weeks of payments are complete.4 '
42
Failure to do so bars reimbursement.

Whenever the employer can prove a preexisting permanent
physical impairment he should consider applying to the Second

Injury Fund for reimbursement. The impairment must have resulted in a disability that entitles a claimant to over seventy-

eight weeks of compensation and that predates the employment
and perhaps postdates retention. In addition either the employer
must have filed written notice of the impairment with the Com-

mission or the employee must have concealed the impairment, or
have been unaware of it. The employer should notify the Fund
in writing of the claim before the first seventy-eight weeks of
payments are concluded. While this interpretation of this statute
is undoubtedly not what was intended when the Second Injury
Fund provisions were initially passed, the 1974 amendment cre-

ates this possibility and relieves the employer of some of the
burden of the liberal construction doctrine.
compensation claims in South Carolina, or combines with a subsequent injury
to cause a permanent impairment rated at seventy-eight weeks or more under
§ 42-9-30.
Id. § 42-9-400(d)(31) (emphasis added). The statute could have several interpretations.
First, the permanence and hindrance presumptions might apply only to diseases (1) to
(30) because (31) requires proof of permanence and is a general provision. Second, the
presumption of permanence might not apply to diseases under (31), but the employer need
not prove hindrance to employment. Third, both presumptions might apply to (31). This
last interpretation is reached by construing "permanent in nature" to be somehow different from the "permanent" presumption. Underlying these interpretations is the question
whether any impairment not listed in (1) to (31) can come under the second injury
provisions provided the employer proves permanence and hindrance without the aid of
these presumptions. In addition, the employer would have to show the benefits will be
paid over seventy-eight weeks because reimbursement for benefits does not begin until
then. Id. § 42-9-400(a), (d). See id. § 42-9-400(a)(2), -400(b).
37. Id. § 42-9-400(d)(31).
38. Id, § 42.9-400(d)(31)(a).
39. Id. § 42-9-400(d)(31)(b).
40. Id. § 42-9-400(e).
41. Id. § 42-9-400(f).
42. Id.
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B. Aggressor Defense and Termination of Employment
A second example of how the Act is liberally construed in
favor of compensating the claimant centers on one of the employer's defenses to liability. In Kinsey v. Champion American
Service Center,3 the court held the aggressor defense is not a bar
to compensation in South Carolina for injuries sustained in an on
the job fight. The claimant in Kinsey, a service station attendant,
was injured in a fight with a co-employee. The claimant had a
history of conflicts with the other employee, Brown, over Brown's
authority to supervise the claimant at the station. On the day
of the injury, Brown ordered claimant to service some cars that
had arrived at the station and a fight ensued. The facts were
in conflict over whether one or two fights occurred, whether
claimant's employment was terminated, and whether Kinsey or
Brown struck the first blow.4
The employer argued that claimant had been the aggressor
in the fight and was therefore barred from recovery under the
Compensation Act.45 The Commission and the court of common
pleas found that the claimant was the aggressor and denied compensation."8
On appeal the issue presented to the court was whether the
claimant had been the aggressor, in the sense of one who began
the violence."7 The employer contended that under Zeigler v.
8 the aggressor defense
South CarolinaLaw Enforcement Division"
9
was recognized in South Carolina. Reversing for the claimant,
the supreme court held the Act does not encompass an aggressor
defense. 0
The Commission's basic finding was bottomed upon the inappropriately denominated "aggressor defense." The Workmen's
43. 268 S.C. 177, 232 S.E.2d 720 (1977).
44. The employer's claim was that after an initial fight the claimant returned and
started another. This could have the effect of removing the work-related flavor from the
incident and could make the injury a noncompensable accident because it did not arise
out of and in the course of employment. See generallyA. LARSON, supra note 11, at § 11.13.
45. Brief of Defendants-Respondents at 3-10.
46. Transcript of Record at 63-65, 70-72.
47. Brief of Claimant-Appellant at 1, 5-7; Brief of Defendants-Respondents at 1, 310. Although the question was so phrased in the appellant's brief, the appellant's focus
was the statute's language, not whether the Act has an aggressor defense as a matter of
law.
48. 250 S.C. 326, 157 S.E.2d 598 (1967).
49. Brief of Defendants-Respondents at 2-3.
50. 268 S.C. at 180, 232 S.E.2d at 721.
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Compensation Act has eliminated all issues and degrees of negligence. There is no statutory defense labeled aggressor defense.
The only relevant statutory provisions which, under certain well
delineated circumstances, supports an aggresor defense is S.C.
Code § 72-156 [S.C. Code Ann. § 42-9-60 (1976)]. 11
The court then addressed the meaning of section 42-9-60, which
creates a "wilful intention" defense. The statute reads as follows:
No compensation shall be payable if the injury or death was
occasioned by the intoxication of the employee or by the wilful
52
intention of the employee to injure or kill himself or another.
The employer contended that an aggressor or one who struck the
first blow, willfully intended to do injury and was barred from
receiving compensation.53 According to the court, however, the
question cannot be answered by determining who threw the first
punch. The "delineated circumstances" in which the defense will
bar compensation are first, when the employee's conduct is serious or aggravated," and second, when the conduct is deliberate
or premeditated, evincing "a voluntary acquiescence in the settlement of the dispute by violence." 55 Altercations do not make
out a defense if they are "spontaneous, impulsive, instinctive or
otherwise lacking a deliberate or formed intention to do injury." 6
Characterizing the claimant's conduct as serious, deliberate,
or spontaneous will be a question of fact for the Commission."
Forcing the Commission to focus on the "willful intention" rather
than "merely on who strikes the first blow,"5 requires a more
difficult determination, but in view of the language of the statute,
it is probably more congruous with the legislative intent of the
Act. The interpretation is also another example of how the Act is
liberally construed in favor of compensation coverage for the
claimant.
51. Id.
52. S.C. CODE ANN. § 42-9-60 (1976).
53. Brief of Defendants-Respondents at 2-10.
54. 268 S.C. at 181, 232 S.E.2d at 721-22 (quoting Zeigler v. South Carolina Law
Enforcement Div., 250 S.C. 326, 157 S.E.2d 598 (1967), and citing Reeves v. Carolina
Foundry & Machine Works, 194 S.C. 403, 409, 9 S.E.2d 919, 921 (1940)).
55. 268 S.C. at 180-81, 232 S.E.2d at 721-22, (quoting Zeigler v. South Carolina Law
Enforcement Division, 250 S.C. 326, 157 S.E.2d 598 (1967)). See A. LARSON, supra note
11, at § 11.15(d).
56. 268 S.C. at 181, 232 S.E.2d at 722.
57. This is implied in the court's discussion of the Commission as the fact finding
body. Id.
58. Id. at 181, 232 S.E.2d at 721.
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Justice Littlejohn, in his dissent, disagreed with the majority's reading of the case precedent.59 He stated, "It is the law of
this State that a claimant cannot be said to have suffered 'an
injury by accident,' as defined by § 72-14 [S.C. Code Ann. § 421-160] of the Act if he is found to be the aggressor. Zeigler v. S.C.
Law Enforcement Division .... "60 As the majority noted, however, the court in Zeigler had not denominated its holding as an
aggressor defense and instead had concentrated on the seriousness of the conduct as proving a willful intention to injure the
coemployee.6 ' Most jurisdictions align with the stance taken by
the majority. 2 When the employee's conduct is not serious or
premediated, the employee is entitled to compensation for the
injury. 3 Professor Larson has noted the "volatile" nature of the
aggressor defense: since 1947, most jurisdictions have reversed
their previous positions and abolished the defense.64
Even if the employer cannot prove willful intent, the claimant cannot recover unless the injury arose by accident arising out
of and in the course of employment.65 In considering this question,
the court in dicta indicated it may accept an important new rule
for South Carolina. The employer had argued that claimant's
employment had been terminated before the altercation and
therefore the injury was not "in the course of employment"
under the statute.6 Looking at the employer's own testimony, the
court held it could not conclude that the injurry was not in the
course of employment." Even if the claimant's employment had
been terminated the court found that "[t]he employee is still
within the course of employment for a reasonable time to allow
for his departure and the conclusion of his affairs." 6 In future
cases involving termination of employment, therefore, the court
has indicated it will look to whether the employee has had a
reasonable opportunity to leave the premises in deciding whether
the injury was in the course of employment.
59. Id. at 183-86, 232 S.E.2d at 723-24 (Littlejohn, J., dissenting).
60. Id. at 184-85, 232 S.E.2d at 723.
61. Id. at 181, 232 S.E.2d at 721. See Zeigler v. South Carolina Law Enforcement

Div., 250 S.C. at 329-31, 157 S.E.2d at 579-80.
62. See A. LARSON, supra note 11, at § 11.15(a), (c)-(d).
63. See id. at § 11.15(d).
64. Id. at § 11.15(c).

65. See notes 1-5 and accompanying text, supra; 268 S.C. at 182, 232 S.E.2d at 722.
66. Brief of Defendants-Respondents at 10-13.
67. 268 S.C. at 183, 232 S.E.2d at 722-23.
68. Id. at 182-83, 232 S.E.2d at 722. See A. LARSON, supra note 11, at § 26.10.
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Smith, 9 plaintiffs

husband was killed in a sinIn Merritt v.
gle car accident that occured after a meal and on the way to the
hotel where the three occupants of the car were staying on an outof-town business trip. Plaintiff accepted over $22,000 from the
employer's carrier under an award from the Industrial Commission. In a negligence action against the driver, defendant was
granted summary judgment based on a finding that as a coemployee, he was immune from suit under section 42-5-10 of the
compensation act.
On appeal, plaintiff argued that the requirements for immunity raised issues of fact." The supreme court affirmed the
judgment for defendant but in so doing the court used language
that raises questions about the status of the immunity test under
the South Carolina Act.
When an employer pays compensation under the Act, section
42-5-10 grants to the employer and "those conducting his business" immunity from other lawsuits.7 ' Co-employees of the injured person are among those who conduct the employer's business and therefore can be immune. 2 Three conditions must be
69. 269 S.C. 301, 237 S.E.2d 366 (1977).
70. Id. at 304, 237 S.E.2d at 367-68.
71. S.C. CODE ANN. § 42-5-10 (1976). The section provides:
Every employer who accepts the compensation provisions of this Title shall
secure the payment of compensation to his employees in the manner provided
in this chapter. While such security remains in force he or those conducting his
business shall only be liable to any employee who elects to come under this Title
for personal injury or death by accident to the extent and in the manner specified in this Title.

Id.
The immunity accorded by the South Carolina statute and others with similar provisions is not only from common-law causes of action. A. LARSON, supra, note 11 at § 72.20.
In recent cases claimants have attempted to limit immunity by advancing the dual capacity doctrine. Id. at 72.80. In Smalls v. Blackmon, 269 S.C. 614, 239 S.E.2d 640 (1977),
plaintiff contended that under St. Paul Fire & Marine Insurance Co. v. American Insurance Co., 251 S.C. 56, 159 S.E.2d 921 (1968), and the permissive user statute, S.C. CODE
ANN. § 56-9-810(2) (1976), the defendant could be sued in his capacity as a permissive
user of an automobile as opposed to his capacity as a co-employee. The court stated that
language in St. Paul was "clearly dicta" and the defendant's demurrer should have been
granted. 269 S.C. at 617, 239 S.E.2d at 641. The language of the Federal Longshoremen's
and Harbor Workers' Compensation Act (LHWA), 33 U.S.C. §§ 901-50 (1970), which was
at issue in Smalls is different from the South Carolina Act. Under the LHWA, compensation is the exclusive remedy against the employer and "any other person, or persons in
the same employ." Id. § 933(i). See also Strickland v. Textron, 433 F. Supp. 326 (D.S.C.
1977) (discussing the dual capacity doctrine in suits against employers as opposed to coemployees).
72. Eg., Nolan v. Daley, 222 S.C. 407, 73 S.E.2d 449 (1952).
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met for a co-employee to be immune in tort. Logically, the first
requirement is that the injured person's employer must be liable
under the compensation act. Without liability under the Act,
there would be no reason to raise the Act's immunity provisions.
The compensation act test for liability is that the injury must be
3
by an accident arising out of and in the course of employment)
The courts, applying the doctrine of liberal construction, interpret this test broadly and resolve doubts in favor of coverage for
the injured employee.74 The second prerequisite is that the coemployee-defendant must have been conducting the employer's
business at the time of the accident. This follows precisely the
language of section 42-5-10. 71 The court has held this requirement
is met by proof that the employer would have been vicariously
liable for the defendant's actions under the common-law doctrine
of respondeat superior. 7 The rationale behind the use of this test
is that if the employer would have been liable for the defendant's
acts at common law but for the immunity of the compensation
act, the co-employee-defendant should also be accorded immunity. Unlike the first requirement, the courts traditionally did not
interpret the respondeat superior test broadly in favor of coverage
for the employee. Although both of these requirements are essentially "course of employment" tests, because of the varying interpretations and policies behind them, a deviation from the course
of employment under the common-law test is not always a deviation under the compensation test.7 The third requirement is
that the defendant must be an employee of the injured person's
employer.7 8 This requirement removes the cloak of immunity
73. This requirement is expressed in section 42-5-10 in that immunity extends only
for "personal injury or death by accident," which is defined by section 42-1-160 as "injury
by accident arising out of and in the course of employment." See McNaughton v. Sims,
247 S.C. 382, 147 S.E.2d 631 (1966).
74. E.g., Moore v. Family Service of Charleston County, 269 S.C. 275, 281,237 S.E.2d
84, 87 (1977); Douglas v. Spartan Mills, Startex Division, 245 S.C. 265, 140 S.E.2d 173
(1965). For a discussion of this doctrine, see text at notes 1-5 supra.
75. S.C. CODE ANN. § 42-5-10 (1976). For the text of the statute, see note 71 supra.
76. Boykin v. Prioleau, 255 S.C. 437, 179 S.E.2d 599 (1971); McNaughton v. Sims,
247 S.C. 382, 147 S.E.2d 631 (1966); Williams v. Bebbington, 247 S.C. 260, 146 S.E.2d
853 (1966). For a discussion of the respondeat superior doctrine, see W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF ToRTs 460-61 (4th ed. 1971).
77. E.g., Boykin v. Prioleau, 255 S.C. 437, 179 S.E.2d 599 (1971).
78. This requirement was set out in Nolan v. Daley, 222 S.C. 407, 415, 73 S.E.2d 449,
453 (1952), although the statute is not this specific. It states only that "those conducting
[the employer's] business" are immune. S.C. CODE ANN. § 42-5-10 (1976). The employee
requirement might have developed as a consequence of the respondeat superior test,
although Nolan did not recognize this test by name. The court in a North Carolina case
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from third parties, casual workers, and independent contractors10
In Merritt, the court found that no issue of fact was raised
over whether the defendant was an employee of decedent's employer." The main issues, therefore, were whether questions of
fact were raised under the compensation act and common-law
tests as conditions for immunity. s' The court considered together
the questions of whether the husband's death during an out-oftown business trip was by an accident arising out of and in the
course of employment and whether the co-employee-defendant
was acting within the scope of his employment in a common-law
from which the Nolan court quoted extensively states: "We hold that an officer or agent
of a corporation who is acting within the scope of his authority for and on behalf of the
corporation, and whose acts are such as to render the corporation liable therefor, is...
entitled to the immunity. . .. "Warner v. Leder, 234 N.C. 727, 732,69 S.E.2d 6,9 (1952)
cited in Nolan v. Daley, 222 S.C. 407, 414, 73 S.E. 2d 449, 452 (1952). The court in Nolan
went on to state that the co-employee should not be liable "especially where the act of
the employee, in whatever capacity, would render the employer liable at common law."
Id. at 416, 73 S.E.2d at 453.
The other reason for restricting the immunity to employees of the same employer is
to give meaning to the sections allowing suits against third parties. See Warner v. Leder,
234 N.C. 727, 732-33, 69 S.E.2d 6, 8-9 (1952) cited in Nolan v. Daley, 222 S.C. at 41314,
73 S.E.2d at 452 (1952). This interpretation of the requirement, however, leaves open the
question of whether independent contractors are third parties or those conducting the
employer's business. South Carolina has used the employee requirement to restrict coverage to "employees" under the compensation Act, i.e., casual workers and independent
contractors are not immune under this section. See Parker v. Williams & Madjanik, 269
S.C. 662, 239 S.E.2d 487 (1977). North Carolina and Virginia have not limited "conducting
the employer's business" to employees and have extended immunity to some independent
contractors' employees. See A. LARSON, supra note 11 at § 72.34.
79. Parker v. Williams &Madjanik, 269 S.C. 662,239 S.E.2d 487 (1977). See also note
78, supra, for discussion of third party liability.

80. 269 S.C. at 305, 237 S.E.2d at 368. Appellant asserted a question of fact was raised
over whether her husband and the driver were employed by the same employer because
in his first amended answer, respondent listed Philco-Ford Corporation as his employer.
Appellant had listed her husband's employer as Ford Marketing Corporation in response
to request for admissions. In the second amended answer, respondent listed his employer
as Ford Marketing. The court held that respondent's "error, standing alone, does not
create an issue of fact." Id. at 304-05, 237 S.E.2d at 368.
81. Appellant had restricted the questions on appeal to whether the respondent and
deceased were employed by the same employer and whether respondent was conducting
the employer's business; however, the court also considered the other condition for immunity, whether the injury was by accident arising out of and in the course of employment. Id. at 304, 237 S.E.2d at 367-68. Because the meeting of this condition is also a
requirement for receiving a compensation award from the Industrial Commission, this
condition actually should not have been in issue because the Commission already should
have determined that the compensation act test was met in granting its award to appellant, The court, however, appears to be reviewing this finding because the section it cited
from Larson's treatise dealing with business trip cases discusses the compensation act test.
Id.at 307, 237 S.E.2d at 369. See A. LARSON, supra note 11 at § 25.21.
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respondeat superior sense."2 Upon noting that no South Carolina
authority had been cited, the court turned to Professor Larson's
treatise and determined that trips to and from a restaurant while
out-of-town on business "are within the course and scope of the
employment unless the circumstances attending the taking of the
meal constitute a deviation." 3 After considering the precedent on
deviation, the court concluded that the trip to the restaurant was

unquestionably not a deviation.84
In deciding to consider together these two conditions for
immunity, the court used some language which, if taken out of
context, could be misleading. The court stated that "[t]he status of the Appellant's testate was the same as that of the Respondent. . . . .. While it is true both employees were on an out-oftown business trip and in that sense their "status" might be the
same, this language should not be construed as stating that the
facts necessary to meet the first requirement, the compensation
act test, also will always meet the second prerequisite, that the
defendant be conducting the employer's business. 8 The court also
stated that "the co-employee's right to immunity parallels that
of an employer." ' Although whenever the co-employee is granted
tort immunity, the employer, by reason of the compensation act
test, necessarily must be immune, the converse is not always true.
Illustrating these points is the 1971 case of Boykin v.
8 Although the employer
Prioleau.
in Boykin was found liable
under the compensation act, the co-employee also was held liable
in tort." Because of the broad interpretation of the compensation
act test under the statute, common-law liability is not equivalent
to statutory immunity. As in Boykin, cases occur in which the
defendant-employee deviates from his scope of employment and
absolves the employer from liability at common law, but under
82. 269 S.C. at 306, 237 S.E.2d at 368-69. The court did not mention the respondeat
superior test by name but cited the cases in which the test was developed and applied.
Id. at 306, 237 S.E.2d at 368 (citing Boykin v. Prioleau, 255 S.C. 437, 179 S.E.2d 599
(1971); Young v. Warr, 252 S.C. 179, 165 S.E.2d 797 (1969); Powers v. Powers, 239 S.C.
423, 123 S.E.2d 646 (1962); Nolan v. Daley, 222 S.C. 407, 73 S.E.2d 449 (1952)).

83.
84.
85.
86.

269 S.C. at 307, 237 S.E.2d at 369 (citing A. LARSON, supra note 11 at § 25.21).
Id. at 308, 237 S.E.2d at 369-70.
Id. at 306, 237 S.E.2d at 368.
E.g., Boykin v. Prioleau, 255 S.C. 437, 179 S.E.2d 599 (1971).

87. 269 S.C. at 306, 237 S.E.2d at 369.
88. 255 S.C. 437, 179 S.E.2d 599 (1971).

89. Id. at 440, 179 S.E.2d at 600. The hearing commissioner found the employer
liable, but the claim was settled while on appeal without an admission of liability by the
employer. Id. at 440, 179 S.E.2d at 600.
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the broader interpretations of liabilty under the Act, the employer is liable for compensation payments." Immunity in tort is
not coextensive with the employer's liability at common law. In
Merritt, because nothing raised a question of fact over whether
defendant had deviated from the scope of his employment, the
result reached by the court is in line with prior cases, but by
collapsing the two separate tests for compensation act liability
and common-law liability, the court laid the groundwork for future confusion.
Any speculation that the collapsing of these conditions in
Merritt migl~t be a retreat from use of the common-law respondeat superior definition for the conducting the employer's business test was put to rest by Parkerv. Williams & Madjanik, Inc."
Plaintiff's husband was employed by a roofing subcontractor at
a construction project on Hilton Head Island. The husband's
employer contracted with a crane company to provide a crane and
crane operator to erect trusses. The crane operator was requested

by the deceased's employer to place a load of plywood on the roof.
The weight of the load collapsed the roof killing the plaintiff's
husband. On appeal from summary judgment for the defendant
crane company, the supreme court reversed for plaintiff.2
In Parker, the condition that the injury be by an accident
arising out of and in the course of employment was not at issue
because the death clearly was compensable under the Act.13 The
next issue, as in Merritt, was whether the crane operator was
conducting the employer's business. The court stated:
In order for the crane operator to be immune from suit under
section 42-5-10 as a co-employee of the deceased, he must have
been engaged in a course of conduct at the time of the delict that
would have rendered [the subcontractor] liable at common law
under the doctrine of respondeat superior. If the operator is
immune from suit, then [the crane company] is likewise relieved of its vicarious liability.9
Obviously, the common-law respondeat superior test has not
been abandoned despite the confusing language in Merritt.

The question remains whether two different tests for the
90.
91.
92.
93.
been at
94.

See also Williams v. Bebbington, 247 S.C. 260, 146 S.E.2d 853 (1966).
269 S.C. 662, 239 S.E.2d 487 (1977).
Id. at 663, 239 S.E.2d at 488.
Id. at 664, 239 S.E.2d at 488. On whether the compensation act test should have
issue in Merritt, see note 81 supra.
269 S.C. at 665, 239 S.E.2d at 488-89.
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scope of employment should be applied in deciding a coemployee's immunity. South Carolina is one of only a few states
that uses a test separate from the usual compensation act test to
define the scope of co-employee immunity.15 As Professor Larson
states, "After all, there are troubles and complications enough
administering one course of employment test under the Act, without adding a second."9 6 In addition to the simplicity of using one
definition for both tests, Larson advances the argument that part
of the quid pro quo an injured employee receives for giving up the
right to sue the employer in tort is immunity from suit when the
employee himself is later the wrongdoer in a work-related acci7
dent.1
Despite the criticism of using two definitions, some justification for using the respondeat superior test has been advanced.
Use of the respondeat superior test restricts the number of situations in which a co-employee will be found immune. In response

to Larson, it can be argued that the immunity the employer receives is sufficient consideration for the employee's relinquishment of the right to sue at common law. 9 Use of the contract
concept of consideration also seems to have little relevance to
actions against co-employees. The employer and injured employee are the ones exchanging rights and benefits. Only in a
situation in which a tortfeasing co-employee could hold the employer liable at common law should the immunity attach. This
is what is accomplished with use of the respondeat superior test.
Other theories have been advanced for not granting any immunity to co-employees. For example, it is argued that exempting
tortfeasors from suit does not encourage safety on the job.10 Of
95. A. LARSON, supra note 11 at § 72.20. California and Texas also use separate tests.
Saala v. McFarland, 63 Cal. 2d 124, 403 P.2d 400, 45 Cal. Rptr. 144 (1965) (the statutory
language "acting within the scope of his employment" indicates that a test narrower than
the compensation act test is to be used); Ward v. Wright, 490 S.W.2d 223 (Tex. Civ. App.
1973) (respondeat superior test). See A. LARSON, supra note 11 at § 72.20 nn.28-31.
96. A. LARSON, supra note 11 at § 72.20.
97. Id. The quid pro quo rationale is used to explain the benefits and detriments
exchanged by employers and employees under the compensation statutes. In exchange for
relinquishment of defenses and automatic liability, the employer is immune to verdicts
outside the compensation statute for work-related injuries. See generally id. supra note
11 at § 65.10.
98. See, e.g., cases cited in note 95 supra.
99. In a strong dissent to the case that established coemployee immunity in South
Carolina, Justice Stukes sets out several reasons why no immunity should be given fellow
employees. Nolan v. Daley, 222 S.C. 407, 417-21, 73 S.E.2d 449, 553-55 (1952). For his
discussion of the quid pro quo rationale, see id. at 417, 73 S.E.2d at 453.
100. Id. at 419, 73 S.E.2d at 454. For this argument and others used against co-
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course the appropriate juggler of these policy considerations is the
legislature, which has not overruled the court's respondeat superior definition for the conducting the employer's business test.
Despite the ambiguous language in Merritt, the later statement in Parker seems to reaffirm that in industrial accidents
involving two employees, the compensation act test for scope of
employment will be used to define when the employer is immune
in tort and liable under the Act, and the common-law respondeat
superior scope of employment test will be used to define when the
co-employee is conducting the employer's business and immune
from suit in tort.
IL.

GOOD FAITH PAYMENT OF DEATH BENEFITS

When an employee dies from an accident arising out of and
in the course of employment, the employer must pay death benefits under the Workmen's Compensation Act.'0 ' The Act sets out
a four-tiered priority structure under which a prior claimant takes
02
the death benefits to the exclusion of subordinate claimants.
First priority is accorded to persons wholly dependent upon the
deceased.' Widows,"' widowers,' and children' 8 are presumed
employee immunity, see generally A. LARSON, supra note 11 at § 72.10.
101. S.C.CoDE ANN. § 42-9-290 (Cum. Supp. 1977). "Death" is defined as "death
resulting from an injury." Id. § 42-1-110 (1976). "Injury" is defined as "injury by accident
arising out of and in the course of employment." Id. § 42-1-160.
102. Id. §§ 42-9-140, -290. When partial dependents are first in priority, however, the
excess of the death benefit is distributed to either the parents or the Second Injury Fund.
Id. § 42-9-140(b), 140(d).
103. Id. § 42-9-290 (Cum. Supp. 1977). If more than one person was totally dependent
upon the deceased, the benefit is divided among them. Id. § 42-9-130. An exception is that
a surviving spouse with two or more dependent children receives at least one-third of the
death benefit. Id. § 42-9-290.
104. Id. § 42-1-180.
105. Id. § 42-1-190. "Widower" is defined as one who is living with the deceased
and is dependent upon her. Id. "Widow," however, is defined as one living with the
deceased or dependent upon him. Id. § 42-1-180. Although this definition of widower
appears to circumvent the conclusive presumption of dependency, the supreme court
interpreted similar language in the definition of "child" as not requiring proof of dependency. Flemon v. Dickert-Keowee, Inc., 259 S.C. 99, 190 S.E.2d 751 (1972). In addition,
the United States Constitution may require the widows and widowers have the same
burden of proof. Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677 (1973) (statute requiring servicewoman to prove her husband's dependency in fact while servicemen's wives are presumed dependent violates due process). See Weinberger v. Wiesenfeld, 420 U.S. 636
(1975). But see Kahn v. Shevin, 416 U.S. 351 (1974) (upheld validity of tax exemption
for widows).
106. S.C. CODE ANN. § 42-1-70 (1976). The definition of "child" includes an
"acknowledged illegitimate child dependent upon the deceased." The "dependent" language of the definition does not require independent proof of dependency by the child.
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to be wholly dependent." 7 Nevertheless, other claimants can
qualify for the first priority by proving their actual total dependence upon the deceased.' If no total dependents exist, the statute entitles partial dependents to claim the death benefits., 9 If
no total or partial dependents exist, the deceased's parents reveive the benefits."0 Finally, if the deceased is survived by neither
dependents nor parents, the actual cost of burial and administration of the deceased's estate are paid to his personal representative and the balance to the benefit is paid to the Second Injury
Fund."'
The payment of death benefits to a claimant actually entitled to priority under the Act discharges the employer from additional liability." 2 In contrast, disbursements to a claimant apparently entitled to the benefits may not relieve the employer from
liability to a person who subsequently files a claim asserting a
prior right to the payments."' Section 42-9-340 delineates the
situations in which the erroneous payments will discharge the
employer from liability to the rightful claimant for the already
expended installments." 4 Under that section if an employer actFlemon v. Dickert-Keowee, Inc., 259 S.C 99, 190 S.E.2d 751 (1972). See Workmen's Compensation, Annual Survey of South CarlinaLaw, 25 S.C.L. REV. 512-13 (1973).
107. S.C. CODE ANN. § 42-9-110 (1976).
108. Id. § 42-9-120. The supreme court has defined dependency as follows:
"'Total dependency' had reference to a dependent who receives all of his support from the employee, and 'partial dependency' to one who receives less than
his entire support from that source * * *." . . . A claimant is not to be deprived
of the benefits of a wholly dependent person, when otherwise entitled thereto,
on account of temporary gratuitous services rendered by others, occasional financial assistance received from other sources, existence of other possible sources
of support, minor considerations or benefits which do not substantially modify
or change the status of the claimant, some slight savings of his own, some other
slight property, mere physical ability to work in the past, present or future, or
the mere ability to earn something in any manner by his own services.
Cokeley v. Robert Lee, Inc., 197 S.C. 157, 165-66, 14 S.E.2d 889, 892 (1941) (citations
omitted).
109. S.C. CODE ANN. § 42-9-290 (Cum. Supp. 1977). If more than one person is
partially dependent, the benefit is divided among them according to their dependency.
Id. § 42-9-130. Any excess is paid the parents or the Second Injury Fund. Id. 42-9-140(b),
140(d).
110. Id. § 42-9-140(a).
111. Id. § 42-9-140(c). Payments from the Second Injury Fund are governed by § 429-400, See generally Custy, supra note 33 at 678-79.
112. S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 42-9-140, 340 (1976).
113. Id.; Airco v. Hollington, 269 S.C. 152, 236 S.E.2d 804 (1977).
114. S.C. CODE ANN. § 42-9-340 (1976).
Payment of death benefits by an employer in good faith to a dependent subsequent in right to another dependent shall protect and discharge the employer,
unless and until such dependent prior in right shall have given notice of his
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ing in good faith pays death benefits to a dependent not entitled
to priority, the employer is discharged from liability to the rightful claimant."' The supreme court first interpreted the good faith
provision of the section in Airco, Inc. v. Hollington"6 and held
that for an employer to qualify for protection from double liability
it must conduct a reasonably diligent investigation into the
claimant's right to benefits.
At the original hearing before the Commissioner in Airco, the
parents of the deceased employee testified under oath that they
were wholly dependent upon the deceased. 1 7 They also testified
that the deceased had no legitimate or illegitimate children." 8
The Commissioner held the parents were dependent and awarded
them commuted death benefits."'
After the carrier had paid over $22,000 to the deceased's
parents, an illegitimate child of the deceased filed a claim for
benefits. At a second hearing evidence was presented that the
parents had not been actually dependent on the deceased. Furthermore, many witnesses from the community testified that the
deceased had acknowledged paternity of the child. Therefore, the
Commissioner found that under the Act's priority structure the
child, not the parents, was entitled to the death benefit.' 21Neverclaim. In case the employer is in doubt as to the respective rights of rival
claimants, he may apply to the Commission to decide between them.
Id.
115.
116.
117.
118.

Id.
269 S.C. 152, 236 S.E.2d 804 (1977).
Record at 9, 12.
Id.

119. Commutation has been defined as "[t]he conversion of the right to receive a
variable or periodical payment into the right to receive a fixed or gross payment." BLACK'S
LAW DICTIONARY 351 (4th ed. 1968). The finding and the award are possibly inconsistent.
If the parents were actually dependent, payment would normally have been weekly rather
than lump sum. S.C. CODE ANN. § 42-9-290 (Cum. Supp. 1977). If no dependents exist
and the parents are paid under § 42-9-140, the award is the commuted amount of the
benefits. Id. § 42-9-140 (1976). Therefore, the method of payment ordered may not have
been the proper one. In Airco, it meant the carrier was forced to pay the whole commuted
balance twice rather than the sum of the weekly payments from the award date to the
date of notice given by Everette Frazier, the illegitimate child, and his mother.
The method of payment is not wholly out of line because the Commission does have
some leeway in paying lump sums to dependents. After the first installment,
"compensation shall be paid in installments weekly, except when the Commission determines that payment in installments shall be made monthly or in some other manner."
Id. § 42.9.240 (emphasis added). After six weeks of installments the parties can request
the Commission to redeem weekly payments for a lump sum. Id. § 42-9-300. For further
discussion of lump sum payments, see Administrative Law-Annual Survey of South
CarolinaLaw, 29 S.C.L. REv. 1, 11-15 (1977).
120. Record at 33.
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theless the Commissioner denied the child's claim because the
employer had, in good faith and pursuant to a Commission order,
paid the employee's parents. 1 '
The full Commission reversed the Commissioner's ruling and
ordered payment of benefits to the child.' Commissioner Leverette asserted that the facts presented did not establish the exercise of good faith in the payment of the death benefits to the
parents.'1 In addition to the failure of the employer to conduct a
good faith investigation into the parents' right to the benefits, the
Commission mentioned other factors supporting reversal. Commissioners Nelson and Reid stressed the duty of "administrative
tribunals . . .[to] bend over backwards to protect the rights of

a minor. 124 Those Commissioners felt that the burden of pursuing proceedings against the unjustly enriched parents should be
on the employer, who could better bear it, rather than on the
child who was entitled to the benefits.'2
The full Commission's decision was affirmed by both the
court of common pleas 2 and the supreme court. 27 The supreme
court held that the employer must prove that it actually made an
investigation to locate the proper recipient of the death benefits
to meet the good faith standard for protection from payment of
28
double benefits.
In rendering the decision the supreme court viewed as precedent Green v. Briley, 121 a case decided under a similar provision
of the North Carolina Workmen's Compensation statute.' 5 In
Green the carrier investigated the dependency status of the de121. Id.
122. Id. at 37-38. Commissioner Addis, without explanation, voted to affirm the

award of Commissioner Dreher. Id. at 39.
123. Id. at 36.
124. Id. at 38.
125. Id. at 38-39. On the employer's problems with suing for back compensation, see
Workmen's Compensation: Recovery for Payments Made Pursuant to a Subsequently
Reversed Award, 32 MD. L. REv. 427 (1973), reprinted in 2 WORK. Comp. L. REv. 217
(1975).
126. Record at 39-48.
127. 269 S.C. 152, 236 S.E.2d 804 (1977).
128. Id. at 159-60, 236 S.E.2d at 807. The court had first ruled that the res judicata
defense did not apply to a situation in which the illegitimate son was not a party to the
prior proceeding and that the son's claim was timely filed. Id. at 158, 236 S.E.2d at 807.
129. 242 N.C. 196, 87 S.E.2d 213 (1955).
130. The court often looks to North Carolina decisions in cases in which our statute
has not been interpreted and the North Carolina statute is similar. See, e.g., Nolan v.
Daley, 222 S.C. 407, 412-13, 73 S.E.2d 449, 451 (1952). For North Carolina's comparable
statute, see N.C. GEN. STAT. § 97-48(c) (1972).
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ceased's relatives but received only information substantiating
the false testimony of the deceased's mother and brother. The
North Carolina Industrial Commission awarded benefits to the
mother, and the carrier paid her. Afterwards, the mother sent a
Christmas card to the deceased's wife informing her for the first
time that her husband had died. The Supreme Court of North
Carolina affirmed the Commission's order denying the wife benefits and held the insurance carrier had paid in good faith and had
met the statute's requirements.' 3 '
The South Carolina Supreme Court noted that the significant difference between Airco and Green is that the insurance
carrier and employer in Airco did not show they had conducted
an independent investigation.
[Tihe text of the opinion in the Green case leaves little doubt
in our view that no such good faith can be said to be present
absent the showing of an investigation to determine who is actually entitled to receive the benefits. Such a holding, while not
expressed in precise language, is certainly inferable. Even were
this not so, we think that the necessity for requiring the showing
of such an investigation would follow logically and fairly nonetheless.'32
Therefore, under Airco, to establish the good faith necessary to
invoke the Act's protection against, double payment, the employer must present evidence of an investigation.
The court did not fully detail the scope of this investigation.
The court defined good faith as follows:
We agree with the rationale of the lower court that good faith
"imports reasonable diligence in utilizing the available sources
of information and seeking to ascertain the facts upon which an
intelligent good faith judgment can be made" as to the person
entitled to the benefits.'
The decision indicates that the investigation must involve more
than simply questioning interested parties.'34 Furthermore, the
employer apparently will be held responsible for any readily
available evidence of the existence and dependency of potential
131. 242 N.C. at 201, 87 S.E.2d at 216.
132. 269 S.C. at 159, 236 S.E.2d at 807.

133. Id.
134. In Green v. Briley, 242 N.C. 196,87 S.E.2d 213 (1955), the carrier had questioned

persons other than the deceased's relatives in the county where he died. Id. at 200, 87
S.E.2d at 216.
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claimants. 3 ' To protect the interest of statutorily entitled dependents from fraudulent claims, the court has placed the burden of
investigation upon the employer. Although the employer is only
arguably the best qualified entity to probe into one's entitlement
to benefits, the prospect of paying twice should provide sufficient
incentive to compel the employer to investigate the claimant's
actual right to benefits.'35
The Airco decision is troubling in at least one aspect. The
court stressed that the parents of the deceased "were not entitled
to payment at all under the pertinent provisions of the Workmen's Compensation Act."'37 This assertion, however, is misleading and obscures a significant issue on the scope of the protection
against double liability provided by the good faith provision. At
the first hearing the evidence established that the claimants were
the parents of the deceased. Therefore, under section 42-9-140,
they were entitled to benefits if the deceased employee left no
dependents.' 31-' If the employer in Airco had made an investigation sufficient under section 42-9-340 into the entitlement to
death benefits and concluded that the deceased left no dependents, the employer would have been justified under the statute
in paying the benefits to the deceased's parents. A problem arises,
however, if after the payment is made to the parents, a dependent
of the deceased surfaces and files a claim against the employer
for death benefits. In this situation the employer apparently cannot invoke the good faith provision of section 42-9-340 to bar a
recovery by the dependent, because the protection of section 429-340 applies only to payments made to a "dependent" subsequent in right to another dependent.""'3 The separate discharge
135. 269 S.C. at 160, 236 S.E.2d at 807.08.
136. Under the Act, once liability is established the employer must pay the entire
amount of the death benefit to either the dependents, the parents, or the Second Injury
Fund. S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 42-9-140, 290 (1976 & Cum. Supp. 1977). In addition, if the
employer is tardy with payments, a ten percent penalty can be assessed. Id. § 42-9-90
(1976). The upshot is that other than the prospect of paying twice, the employer has little
incentive to investigate a claimant's actual right to death benefits.
137. 269 S.C. at 159, 236 S.E.2d at 807.
137.1. S.C. CODE ANN. § 42-9-140(a) (1976).
If the deceased employee leaves no dependents, the employer shall pay the
commuted amounts provided for in § 42-9-290 for whole dependents, less burial
expenses which shall be deducted therefrom, to his father and mother, irrespective of age or dependency.
Id. See note 110 and accompanying text supra.
138. S.C. CODE ANN. § 42-9-340 (1976) (emphasis added). The court appeared to
recognize this problem by stating the parents "were not 'dependents subsequent in right
to another dependent' under Section 42-9-340." 269 S.C. at 159, 236 S.E.2d at 807.
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provision in section 42-9-140 releases the employer if "payment
is made as prescribed in this section," but that section decrees
that the deceased employee must have left no dependents if parents are paid the benefits.'39 Therefore, when parents are paid
under section 42-9-140 without regard to dependency, the statute
apparently affords the employer no protection against double
payments if a dependent subsequently appears.
An appropriate amendment to the statute would be to provide for discharge of liability if payment under section 42-9-140
is made after a reasonably diligent investigation into the possibility of claimants prior in right. 4 1 Meanwhile, when a factual basis
exists, the employer should ensure that a death benefits award to
parents is grounded on dependency, not section 42-9-140. If the
employer makes a sufficient investigation to establish good faith
and bases the award on section 42-9-340 it would then be protected from the possibility of double payment.
The Airco decision also raises a problem concerning the
method of payment.' Obviously, an employer who pays benefits
by the week, rather than in a lump sum, is likely to have paid
out less by the time a new claimant appears. Lump sum awards
in these cases subject the employer to higher liability if the original claimant is ultimately declared ineligible for benefits. The
administrative burden of weekly benefit payments and the cost
of maintaining insurance reserves may, however, weigh in favor
of lump-sum payments despite the rare case in which large benefits will have to be paid twice. An alternative approach to lump
sum payments might be periodic payments until the running of
the statute of limitations for filing claims,4 2 but the one-year
limit might not bar the action of a minor.'
139. S.C. CODE ANN. § 42-9-140 (1976). Of course, an employer could argue that
"dependent" under section 42-9-340 should be interpreted broadly or that section 42-9140 should be interpreted as only requiring the employer to conduct a good faith investigation into whether there are dependents.
140. The discharge provision of § 42-9-140 could be amended as follows:
Payment under this section after a reasonably diligent investigation into the
claimant's right to benefits shall release the employer from all death benefit

liability.
141. See note 119 supra.
142. S.C. CODE ANN. § 42-15-40 (1976). "The right to compensation under this Title
shall be forever barred . . . if death resulted from the accident, unless a claim be filed
with the Commission within one year thereafter." Id.
143. Id. § 42-15-50. "No limitation of time provided in this title for the giving of
notice or making claim under this Title shall run against any person who is mentally
incompetent or a minor dependent as long as he has no guardian, trustee or committee."

Id.
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The easiest method of ensuring protection, therefore, is to
conduct and document a diligent investigation into the claimant's right to receive the death benefits. If the employer pays
benefits to a dependent and can prove a diligent investigation,
the Act protects the employer from double liability. In this situation, the rightful recipient's sole remedy is an action against those
unjustly enriched for the benefits paid before notice was given to
'
the employer. 44
Elizabeth A. Carpentier
144. Id. § 42-90-340. The statute protects the employer "unless and until such depen-

dent prior in right shall have given notice." Id. The legislature's apparent intent is to
protect the employer from having to repay benefits paid before notice was given.
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